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ABSTRACT:  In  this paper  r+e  analyze  a class of nonetary  policy  rul"es that
provide  complete insulation  for large econonies fron  foreign  real  and
monetary disturbances. The  rule requires the central bank  to  float  the
exchange  rate  and  manage  the interest  rate.  In particular,  the  inter€st
rate  is  targeted in  such a way that  the domestic  excess  denand  for  noney  is
independent  of  donestic  interest rate variations  that  may result  tro!',
foreign disturbances  transnitted through  integrated capital markets.
The  paper  focuses on a combination  interest  rate  and  exchange rate
policy  because ne  recognize that  there ar€  trro  channels  througb  which
foreign  ilisturbances can inpinge on the donestic economy.  These  are  through
cornnodity  narkets  and  capital markets, To  successfully  eliminate  such
disturbances the central  bank needs  tlro instrurents.  These  are purchases  and
sales of donestic  assets  and  foreign assets.
Under  almost  all  circunstances the insulating  policy  is  found  to  be
suboptimal in terns of inininizing the variability  of d.onestic  output.  This
is  true because  by insulating the domestic  economy  from foreign disturbances
the  central  bank forgoes the opportunity to  export  donestically  sourced
alisturbances  to foreign countries. Optinal policy almost  alHays  reguires the
central bank  to manage  both the exchange  rate and  the interest rate.
*  The  vievs expresseil  irr this  paper are solely  those of  the  authors
should  not be attributed either to the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas or
federal  Reserve  Systen.
and
the1.  INTRODUCTION
During  the  era of fixed exchange  rates it  was  generally felt  that  a
tnovenent  to  flexible  exchange rates  vould  reduce  the  international
transnission of  disturbances and allow countries to pursue  nore  independent
Donetary policies.  Experience xith  flexible  exchange  rates  after  19?3,
however,  indicateal little  perceptible  change  in  the alegree  of  cross-country
correlation in real econonic  activity  lsee  shafer and  Loopesko  (1983),  Artus
and  Young  (1919)  and  Frenkel (1980)1. This led to a lnore  eclectic  apProach
to  exchange  rate  nanagex0ent.  It  has been  claimed that  the apparent  failure
of  flexible  exchange  rates  to provide adequate  insulation  strengthened  the
case  for activist  exchange  narket intervention policies  lGoldstein  (1980),
pp.  48-54, for exanplel  . This paper  investigates policies that  do  provide
conplete  insulation  for  large econonies  in a norld  with  perfect  capltal
ncbiLity.  I{e  identify  a combination  of interest rat€ and  exchange  rate rules
that  i.nsulates a  country  fron foreign  reel  and  nonetary disturbances
transnitted  through  both the current and capital  accouht. I{e  discuss  the
optinality  of folloring  such  a policy.
There  is  already  a rather  extensive  literature  on  the  insulating
properti.es  ot  exchange  rates for  the snall- open  econorny.l This  paper  is
different  in  that  we exarnine  a two (large)  country version of  the  typical
snal1  country frarnework. llore inportantly,  we acknowledge  the  tuajor  role
played  by integrated capital narkets  as a source  of foreign disturbances in
the  dornestic economy.  Thus  }te  allor+ the central  banks  in  each  country  to
employ interest  rate  mles  as well  as exchange  rate rules  as they  seek  to
attain  independence  fron foreign  disturbances. our najor  conclusions are  as
follows.  ExchaDge  rate  nanagernent  alone is  capable  of  eliminating  the
transnission  of either foreign real or foreign nonetary  disturbances.but is2
incapable of  sinultaneously elininating  both.  Hence. when considering
exchange  rate  pollcies  a1one, one concludes with  the usual  reconnendatlon to
float  or  fix  the exchange  rate  depending  on the nature  of  the  foreign
disturbance.  uosever,  a policy  wherein the exchange  rate  floats  anal the
interest rate is nanaged  is  capable  of elininating  the transnission  of  both
types  of  ilisturbanc€. The foreign  central  bank nay at  the same  tine  pursue
such a policy  and elininate  the transmission of  donestic disturbances to  its
own  econohy.  In other sords. flexible  exchange  rates  coxnbined  rith  interest
rate nanagenent  in  each  country is  a feasible  joint  policy  combination  which
provides  monetary autonony and elininates  conpletely  the  international
transnission  of alisturbances.
The  intuition  behind  these  results is  that,  in a completely integrated
trading world, there are just  ttro  channels  of transnission  of  disturbances:
the  goods  narket and the capital  market. Ideally  the Fed  would  require  t\'fo
instrunents  to  target each  source  of for€ign dislurbance.  lihile  the  Fed
controls  only  the boney  supply, since it  has t$o  cothponents  dornestic
assets anil foreign assets --  there are in  fact  two proxinate instrunents  for
independent use.  Directing  the exchange  rate,  or  purchases of  foreign
assets,  towards the connodity  Irarket  and  directing the interest  rate,  or
purchases of  doarestic  assets, tolrards the capital  urarhet  is  sufficient  for
conplete insul  at  ion  .
Though  feasible,  it  generally rli1I  not be optimal for  the central  bank
to pursue  a policy of conplete  insulation. This is  because,  given the  fixed
behavior  of  the foreign  central  bank, it  is  allrays possible to  export  sone
domestic disturbances abroad  and  reduce  the overall variance of  domestlc
output.  In  support of  this  clain  we  show  lhat  the only time  an  insulating
policy  is  optinal  is  when  there are no  donestic  disturbances  and  onlyJ
foreign disturbances. In general  , central  banks  ni11 alvays want narrag€  both
the exchange  rate  and the interest  rate  to differing  degrees'
The  renrainder ot  this  paper is  as follows.  section  2  outlines  the
assuurptions  and basic setuF of  the motlel. section 3 postulates central  bank
behavior and introd.uces  the noney  supply processes. The solution  for  output
and  price in each  country is  obtained  in section 4. In section 5 a  variety
of  policies  are consitlered  and their  irnplications  for  output variability  are
examined.  Section  6 briefly  discusses  the optinality  of various policies and
concluding  connents  are presented  in Section  7,
2.  THE  MODEI]
ve  consider  a stylized  two country nodel tilth  perfect  conrnodity and
capital  nobility.  The  motivation for  this  approach  is  that it  exar,ir'es  an
integrated  trading  vorld  wherein  foreign and  donestic  disturbances are
transnitted  i.nternationally  with the utnost ease' 1f  insulatirrg  policies
exist  in  such an environment  then they surely exj.st in  a world  !.ith  less
than perfect comnodity  and/or asset arbitrage.
To  this  end consiiler two countries that  proaluce  and consume the  sane
perfectly substitutable good.  Production  occurs  in spatially  distinct  areas
but,  in the abs€nce  of transportation costs or oth€r inpedim€nts  to  trade,
we  can  consider  a single vorld narket where  prices adjust to ensure narket
clearing  period  by period.  Consequently,  purchasing  power  parity  alvays
hoIds.
forldwide  connodity denand  is  assumed  to depend  on the  real  interest
rate  in each  country. For sihplicity  ne ignore the influence  of  aggregate
income  on the demand  for  coromodities  and instead focus on the  intertenporal
substitution possibilities  facing consumers.4
comnodity  supply in  each country follows  tbe stanilard wage coDtracting
specification  where  only unanticipated price  disturbances  produce  output
00venenEs.
There is  one type of  bond  perfectly  nobile norld  ide so that  uncovered
interest  rate  parity  is  an equilibriurn condition  of  the moalel.
The  dernand  for  noney  in  each  country is  assurned  to be  proportionateLy
related  to  the price  1evel,  positively  rel"ated to the level  of  real  income
and  inversely related to the noninal rate of interest.
These  assumptions  are surrniarized  in  the following  model:
vt  = Yn  + 8(pt -  E1-1ps)  + es  (1)
l,lt = pt  + Yt -  Fit  (2)
it  = rt  + EtPt+l -  pt  (3)
.* yi  = yi + B*(pt  - us-1p[)  + el  (4)
^r(
ut  = pi + Yt - !-it  (5)
it  = '[  + Etp[+r  - pL  (6)
Yt + Yt = An  - crt - c*rt  (7)
pr=pt+et  (8)
it  = ii  + Eret+1  - er.  {9)
{ith  the exception  oi  it,  rt,  Y1  anil  Y[,  a]l  variables are expressed  as  in
logarithnrs,2 An  asterisk denotes  a foreign variable, t  denotes the  time
period  and superscripts d and s denote demand  and supply respectively.  The
definitions of the variables are:
U = the noninal stock of  money
p = the price leve1
Y = real  income
i  = the nominal  interest  rate5
r  = the real-  interest rate
e = the exchange  rate.  the donestic price  of  foreign  currency.
Eg(.)  represents  the conditional expectation  of variable . given  period  t
infornation.  Equations  (1)  and (4) are the  cobmodity  supply  relations.
Equations (2,  and  (5) are the noney  denanal  functions while  (3)  and  (5)
specify  the  Fisher eguations. ttorldvide coBlnoality  narket  clearing  occurs
accoriling  to  equation (7).  The t*o  international  arbitrage  conilitions  are
the PPP  relationship (8) and  the uIP ccndition (9). The  variables e1  and  ,i
are  iial  zero  nean  finite  variance  (ol  and  o2*  respectively)  random
variables.
3. THE  },IONEY  SUPPLY  PROCESSES
It  re$alns  to  specify  the noney  supply proeesses of  the  hone  and
foreign  central banks.  For simplicity ve abstract frop.  the  banking sector
and  assune that  the money  stock in  each  country is  equal to  its  $onetary
base  rnade  up of  central  bank  holdings of  international  reserves and dofiestic
credit.  Because  there are the two separate conponents  to  the  noney  supply
the central  banks  are able to nanage  the exchange  rate  by buying and selling
international reserves  in response  to deviations in th€ actual exehange  rate
lrorn  its  target value. Concurrently  the central battk  may  pursue a  noninal
interest rate target by open  rnarket  sales and  purchases  of don:estic assets.
Together  these  policies imply the following rnoney  supply  processes:3
I'tg  = pt + ne(6t -  et) + ni (i1 -  i1)  + ug
u[* = p*t - roitaf  - et) + rnl(iL  - i{)  + rs.
31 is  the donestic  target exchange  rate and  i1 is  the target intelest  rate.
p  is  the systenatic growth rate of  the donestic nroney  supply and u1  is  an
indepenatently  distributed  zero nean  ranilon  di.sturbance  with variance of.  Ttre
(10)
(  11)o
foreign variables are similarly  defined.
The  paraneter ne deternines the degree  to  hich the  donestic  central
bank  is  connitted  to or  supports the target  exchange  rate.  for  be  )  0
exchange  rate  policy  in  the hone  country can be describetl as leaning against
the rinal. As n" becornes  larger  the exchange  rate  becomes  progressively  nore
fixed.  For  me = 0 the exchange  rate is  freely  floating.  si$i1arly,  ni
Deasures the degree  to nhich the central  bank targets  the donestic  noninal
interest  rate.  For rne  * 0 and Ei  + 0 the central  bank is  folloning  a  nixed
policy  of  managing  both the dorrestj.c  interest  rate  and the  exchange rate.
Sinilar  central bank  behavior  is  presuned  for the foreign country.
The target  exchange  rate  in  the houle  econo$y  is  given by
69 = eg + 4t,
where 4 j.s the selected rate  of gronth  (devaluation)
rate.  4  '  0 Hould  correspond  to a crawling  peg  or
Sinilarly,  for  th€ foreign country,
r*  *  *.
et  = e0 t  4 t.
(12)
of the target  exchange
sliding  parity  regi-ne.
(13)
In  choosing  a target  for  the nonina] interest  rate ve require  that  it
in  fact  be achievable by the appropriate selection  of  the  paraheter  ni.
Define a to be the anticipated or systenatic rate of inflation.  That is,
r = f,t-1(p111  - P1).
Then
E1-1ig=n+1L,
here rn is  the natural rate of interest,  or that interest rate in the  horne
country  which ex arte clears the goods  narket.  For rni = ':.  it  nust  be  true
that  ig  = r *  rn.  In  other words, the nominal.  i-nterest rate  target  cannot be
cbosen independently  of  the expected  equilibriun  rate  of  inflation.  In
general,  there is  freedon of  choice regaraling  the value of  r anal thereforei1  (see below). sinilarly,  i[  nust be chosen  conpatible with  r*  given ri.
4.  SOLUTION  OT  THE  }IODEIJ
The  solution  involves naking use of  the market equilibrium  conilitions
to  generate  a set of  expectational equations. These  are solved  using  the
nethod  of  undeternined  coefficients  (see Appenilix  A).  0f  ir'terest  are  the




Pr  = lpt pl]',  r = teo  i.6  i*1' and  xr -  [.1 ,1 rf,[1 
'.
The coefficient  hatrices  are defined:
I rit (6+ni)  (rn+n1  - yn] + (1-11)  11p*+nl)  {ro+n*)  - yf;J
Ko=l - 
[ tt-nil [(p+mi)  (rn+tr)  - ynJ  + 11  t(t*+nl)  {ro+o*)  - Yf;J
flhere
I ri(p+m€4)  + (1-11)1p*-mla*)
,.  1
"r 
I  rr- nil (  p+m"  4) + 11  (o*-m!l*  )
I  nir"  -nint  -(1-11)ne  -(1-11)nt  ]
*'= 
[,r-ni,r"  -(r-nl)rni  -nrn3  -Errni ]
1-nltt+p+n1)-n3(F*+hi) ni  -rltf+rni)-nl(1+p*+ni)  il3  I
x3 = ttA 






Xt = - - 
l+n"+gr!




It  is  evident that  the systenatic  and unanticipateil conponents  of  the8
price  leve1  in  each country depends  on the  systenatic  and  unanticipateil
conponeDts  of  policy  in  each country. Observe  also that  the pair  (12, tt3) is
sinple  linear  transfornation  of  the policy  parameter  pair  (rns, Ini)'  lle
exploit  this  transforuration in  section 6 below.
Fron  equations  (14) Te  have  the anticipated rates of inflation:
" 
= nllp+nsa)  + (1-n1)  1p*-n!n*)  (15)
and
o* = 11  {p*-rn!rr*)  + (1-ni)  (p+rns?),
for aI1 t.
achievable interest  rat  e
or systemat  ic  conponent of
sure that it  cah, in fact.
(16)
target  nust  be
inflation.  The
control  flon'est  1c
I{e  noted  above  that  aD
conpatible  vith  the  expected
central bank. therefore, nust be
inflation.  Note  t  hat
fir', n = (1+m!)  4 + (p*-mln*)
lYr  ^  {:
and
t:q,"=(Y+xr.4)-msri*
*  *  '  t *  * *'|  *  '  ms4)  -  (1+m6)  o*. *:q.t 
= Ins4  +  tP -ne4  )  *llt+('  'r  =  t P+:
In other word.s,  as long as at  least  one of n"  and  nr! is  finite  (only one  of
the tr{o countries attenpts  to  fix  the exchange  rate) ,  then the central  bank
indeed has  control  over  the  systematic rate  of  inflation  with  the
appropriate choice of  p and/or 4.
Solving  for  the domestic  noninal interest rate yields:





dl = -[(1+e)  Kl1  + e*xJ1  + 11
q3  = -[(1+8)K13  + e*r?3  + r]
Each  xij  is  the appropriate  elenent  of
(1?)
a2=-[(1+o)K!2+a*x?21
q4  = -[(1+e)x]4  + e*K?41  -
the natrix K3.  Taking  linits  giveslinir=r-+r. n;*  "
so  tf,.t  a central  bank policy  of  fixing  the noninal interest  rate  rith  a
target rt  is  achievable.  Sinilar  results hold for  the exchange  rate.
5.  EXCHANGE  RATE  ANp  INTEREST  RATE  POLICI!!
I{e  focus  on  exchange rate  and  interest  rate  policies  and  the
international  transnissi.on of  disturbances, Of interest  are the inolications
of  independent  exchange  rate and  interest rate policies.  In the  spirit  of
pre-19?3 policy  discussions  (i,e.  before the conplete  breakdown  of  the
Bretton-l{oods  systen)  the  goal of  the central  bank  in  each  country  is
presumeil to  be to  reduce the international  transmission of  disturbances
both real  and monetary  --  so that  pursuit  of  an independent  monetary poticy
is  possLble. for  th€ home  central ban*  pursuit of this  goal  involves  the
selection of the interest  rate managemerrt  paraneter  (nri), tire exchange  rate
nanagement  paraneter (ng)  ,  the target  rate  of  growth of  the  exchange rate
(n) and  the rate of growth  of the rnoney  supply (p), The  foreign central bank
chooses  sirli 1ar  ly.
5.1 Exchanse  Rate  Pol  icies
Consider a policy where  the domestic  central bank  floats  the  interest
rate  but  fixes the exchange  rate  (mi = 0, ne =,D). In  this  instance  the
unanticipated price  shocks  in  each country are equal and given by
pt - Et-lpt = pt - rt-rpl = -(ni - n!)-11{f*+mi):1  + (1+p*+6!le[  - u[].
The anticipated  rates  of  inflation  are equal and given by
*  *  *,t
tr=tt=p_rDe4
Thus  under  a fixed  exchange  rate  the donestic econony  is  open  to  foreign
real  anal  nonetary disturbances and the donestj.c  anticipated  inflation  rate
is  fully  deternineil by foreign  systematic policies.  The  ilonestic  central10
bank  loses  control  over the donestic noney  supply  Hhich  becones tlenand
deternined.
If  the exchange  rate  is  alloved to  float  freely  (mi = 0, ne = 0)  then
r = p  so expected  inflation  at honre  depends  only on the rate  of  grovth  of
the donestic noney  supply. However,  it  is  evident fron  (14) that  all  of  the
disturbances  inpinge  on donestic output so that  a floating  exchange rate
does  not insulate  the economy fron  any foreign  disturbances.
However,  consider  tbe following policy:  (rni  = 0, ne = 0*f)  . This  would
be  a  dirty  float  where  the central  bank leans against the  wind  with  the
exchange  rate.  Such  a policy  elirnlnates the transnission of  foreign Eonetary
shocks  to  the dohestic econony  through nanipulation of  the  exchange rate
alone.  Alternatively,  (mi  = 0, me  =  -Ft1-he(1+F*+nt)-11  )  insulates  the
donestic  economy fror,r  ioreign  real  disturbances, This requires  a  leanihg
rith  the wind exchange  rate  policy.
Each  of  the  above  exchange  rate  policies  el.i;ninates oDe  source  of
foreign disturbance but is  incapable of  elininating  both. l.loreover,  there is
no coordination of  exchange  rate  polices  (i.e.  any corobination  of  ne and  ni
for ni  = Di* = 0) that will  do the job.
5.3 Interest Rate  Policies
A pure interest  rate  poLicy is  a
= 0) anil  keys  solely  on  the
policy  (ni = -6, lle = 0) imPlies
K14  of K3  disappear. In  this
l{e now  consiiler j.nterest rate  polices.
policy  that  ignores  the exchange  rate  (n"
interest rate.  From  (14) it  is  clear that a
that  fi3  =  0 and thus the elenents K13  and
instance we  hav€
Pt -  Et-lPt = (1+o)-1(rt- .t).
Thus  the influence  of  unanticipated foreign
on  donestic  output is  eliminateil. Further,
honetary and real  ilisturbances
ue = 0 inpties that Tl=  1so11
that  E  = p, Or. the influence of systenatic foreign disturbances is  also
elirninateil. Thus, irrespective  of  the behavior of  the foreign central  bank,
a  policy  of  floating  the exchange  rate  and  nanaging  the  interest  interest
conpletely i.nsulates the domestic  econohy  fron  foreign  disturbances.
The  noney  supply process inplied  by such a rule  is
l{1  = pt-  p(it  -  is)  + u1.
llhen  the  interest  fa1ls  below the target  value the domestic  central  bank
increases  the  soney supply through open  narket purchases  of  assets  by  an
anount  exactly  equal to  the increase in  the hone  alenand  for  Doney.  This
leaning  with  the vind policy  fu1ly  acconnodates  any interest  rate  indueed
change  in  the demand  for  nroney.
It  also follows  that  the foreign  central  bank can indepenilently  pursue
such  a  policy. That is  (nf = -p*, nE  = O) is  a feasible  fully  insulating
policy for  the foreign central bank.  Thus,  flexible  exchange  rates, combined
with  an interest rate rule provide for national nonetary  autonomy,  Hitbout
the need  for  coordi.nation.
5.3 Eqplnri! sion Channels
It  is  eviilent that  a policy  of  fixing  the exchange  rate  and  floating
the  interest  rate,  the policy usually  considered, cannot insulate  the
dohestic  econony fron  foreign  disturbances. This folloss  because of  the
nature  of  the  economic  linkages in an  integrated  trading  t{orial. These
Iinkages are through the connodity narket --  via  cohnodity arbitrage  or  PPP
and  the capital narket --  via assets  arbitrage or UIRP. To  close  the
dobestic economy  to  foreign  ilisturbances requires breakinq these tvo  links.
The  exchange  rate clearly  ties  donrestic  and  foreign prices together  through
the  purchasing  power  parity  relation.  Alloving the exchange  rate  to  float
breaks  this  l-ink. The dobestic ihterest  rate  is  the variable  through  rrhich!2
foreign  capital  narket disturbances inpact on the donestic econony-  If  the
noney  supply is  managed  in  such a way  that  the excess  ilenand  for  noney  is
independent  of the interest rate then foreign capital  narket  disturbances
becone irrelevant,  as occurs under our proposed  rule.  Thus  while  only  the
interest  rate  is  actively nanaged  under  a cornplete  insulation  regime.  1n
fact,  both  elements in  the central bank's  arsenal  of  instrunents  are
directed  totards different  aspects  of economic  integration. It  is  probably
no  coincidence,  then, that central banhs  are often accused  of being  overly
concerned  with dornestic  interest rates. These  forn an inportant component  of
policies  designeil  to  provide central  banks  i'ith  nonetary autonony.
6. OPTII,IAL  POLICIES
To  this  point  we  have  considered  poticies optinal irr  the  sense of
providing  insulation  from  foreiqn  disturbances and  cornplete  monetary
autonony. However, there are other criteria  of optinality  that  might  be
considered. In particular,  do insulating policies entail  costs in terms  of
increased  output variability?  This night be an issue because  if  the domestic
country  insulates itself  from foreign ilisturbances  it  nay  be foregoing  the
opportunity  to export some  of its  own  domestically  sourced  disturbances to
the  foreign  country,  thereby  sacrificing  an  opportunity  to  reduce the
variance  of dohestic  output.
Consider nou  the goal of nininizing  the variance  of  domestic outpltt.
{ithin  the present franework, this  is  the same  as rnininizing th€ variance of
the  forecast  error on output and  very nearly the sane  as  minimizing the
variability  of unanticipated  inflation.  from (1) ancl  (14) we  have
Yt =  Yn  * et(Kll  + 1/6)€t  + Kf2us  +  K13€t  +  xlau[l  -
Thus,13
var(Y1)  = 62  11x11  + 1./o\2oi  + $Ir2)2  r1,  + (K1a3)2ol*  + (K1r4)2o;*l  .
Ho$ever,  noting  that  n2 and 13 are linear  transtornations  of  &e  and  rri
yields  a  transformation  of var(Y1)  that is sonevhat  easier to  sork  with.
Specifically,  denote  |  = (1/9)Zvar(Yg)  then
bl)  -  ctt3 Gtiz - dr3r;+  fr32)
I=  a - (18)
12  tt!  -  13  ttj (n2n)  - n3n!)2
The  coefficients  are defined in  the Appendix.  Deterrnining  the optimal  tr2  and
[3 yields the optinal ne and  mi through  through  the reverse  transfornation.





Froh (14) and the supporting definitions,  this  irr









F  =  Ar
1e*  (1+a*)  ojoj*  +  g(1+e)  oi*oj*J
In general, therefore,  the optimal It2  and lt3, and hence  ne and
functions  of aIl  the structural parameters  and  disturbances  in
The  general  behavior  of the central bank  will  be to nanage  both
rate  ancl the interest rate under  almost  alI  circumstances.
substituting (19) and (20) back  into  (18) yietds
$i = -(l+e+e*)-1tEni  - E[5  - r + (1+0+s*),  + (1+0)],
I  e*.(1+  e*  )  -  e  (  1+  a\  J2  o  lo  i* + [(1+0*)  (1+s+o*]I2oioj  +  to(L+g+e*72s2*o2
(1+6+g*121e*  11+a*)  o!";*  +  s(1+e)  o  j*o,j*l
o'?"o!*  + l(L+o*')zoi  + e2ol*)ol + le*2oi + (1+s)2oi*loi*
n1, vill  be
the  nodel.
the exchange
Furthernore,I  = -a + (fb2 - bcd  + c2e)/(4fe -d2)
L4
(2Ll
so  that,  $heh  follotring  an optinal  policy  the domestic  central  bank  can
always  find  sone rule  that  yields  it  a constant level  of  utility.  In  other
worals,  no hatter  {hat  the actions of  the toreign  central  bank. the  alonestic
central.  bank  can  act  in  such a {av as to  attain  sone  mininal  Level  of
utilj.ty.
To  gain nore insight  in  the nature of  the optimal  policies'  consider
the following  sp€cial cas  es  :
Case 1 :  o'?s  = oj  = O --  the only disturbances in  the econony  are  from  the
foreign  country.  one night  expect the insulating  policy  to be  optirnal  in
this  instance.  This is verified  by substituting for  ol and  ofr  into E anC F
to obtain E = 0 and  F = (1+s). Substituting into m" arnd  ni yields ne = 0 and
ni  =  -6,  which  is  the insulating poticy. This is  the only  time  that  an
insulating policy is  opt  inal .
Case  2 :  oi* =  oj* = 0 --  the only disturbances in  tbe econony  are donestic-
In  this  case f  . .  and E r -a'. The  optirnal policy  requires the central  bank
to  fix  one  or  both  the interest rate  and  the  exchange  rate.  It  is
interesting  to note that  fixing  the interest  rate  alone (ni  = -1  '  1o.  any
exchange  rate  regine, will  be optimal. By  doing  so some of  the  dorrestic
disturbances  are  passed on to  tb€ foreign  econoitly  through  the  capital
narkets.
Case 3 : o; = o2r*  = 0 --  there are only real disturbances  and  no  monetary
shocks. The  optinal  policy  here is  the sane as for  Case  2.
Case  4 :  oi  =  ot* = 0 --  that  is  a world irith  just  nonelary disturbances. In
this  case one can show  that
[(t+e*)2oi + a2  ol,',1
and
e'(1+o*)  air, + €lL+s)  ol*1q
l(1+o*)z  + oz;1ol,  + 1s*2  + (1+B)2loi*.
r = 8{  f.
s"  (1+s*)  oj* + e(1+e)  oj*
Thus,  both the interest  rate  anal  the exchange  rate  are nanaged  to  a  degree
that  depends  on the underlying variances of  the nonetary disturbances. It  is
interestj.ng  to note.  hor.rever,  that  in  this  case I  = 0.  That is  l{heh  there
are just  monetary  disturbances,  the central bank  can  find  a policy that wiIl
conpletely elininate  output variability,  should it  so desire,
Optinal  policies  considered  previously in the literature  have  dealt
fiith  just  exchange  rate nanagenent.  This is  a gpecial case  of the  plesent
model lrith  ni = 0  and  policy choices restricted  to  ne.  Our  analysis
indicates  that  such policies  are alrays suboptinal rhen the  central  bank
has  sufficient  domestie  assets  on hand  to enabl.e  it  to  pursue a  noninal
rnterest rate taldet.
7.  qgxgl!!-1!!!t
This  paper  considers  interest  rate  and  exchange rate  managernent
policies  that  reduce  ttre j.nternatiorial  transnission  of  disturbances and
alLow  countries to pursue more  independent  nonetary policies.  l{e find  that
exchange rate  narragement  alone is  incapa!'le c,f  s  i)Ttul  t  aneous  ly  elj.ninating
the  transnrission of  both foreign real and  nonetary ilisturbances to  the
domestic econony, The  elimination of  foreigri  nonetary disturbanccs is
possible  with an exchange  rate policy of learring  against the  nind  rhereas
the elimination of forei.gn  real disturbances  requires leaning with the uirrd.
Each  policy is  a dirty  float.
Hovever.  an interest rate policy combined  vith  a floating  €xchanq€  rate
is  capable  of sinultaneously  eliminating the trarrsmj.ssion  of  both  forergn
real  and  nonetary disturbances.  By acconmodating  interest  rate  inducedchanges  in  the derrand  for  noney  capital  narket disturlances  are renoved,
floating  the exchange  rate  conmoclity  narket disturbances are elirninated.
is  through these two narkets that  foreign  disturbances are translaitted.
The  cost of  achieving autonorly  will  nearly always  be increased  output
and price  variability.  Only lrhen  there are no domestic  disturbances rtill  an
insulating  policy  be  optinal .  In general the central  bank  will  Yant  to
nanage both the exchange  rate  and the interest  rate.  Thus  it  shoulal  not  be
surprising  that  central  banks  guickly  becane disillusioned  with  fully
flexible  exchange  rate  regimes folloving  the general rnove  to  floating  rates
during  1973.  Nor should it  be surprising  that  central  banks  appear  to  be
preoccupied vith  interest  rates  and the nanagenent  thereof.  Such  behaviour
has been  sbown  to be optinral under general cilcuhstances in  this  paper.
PUt1
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Appe  ndix
I.  In  this  Appendix  we outline  the method  used to  derive  the  solutions
(14).  first  fie  demonstrate  that rt  = rt,  which  follovs  fron the  fact  that
there is  a single  worldwide  good.s  market. I'rorn  (3) and (5)
rt  -  rt  = (it  -  i[)  -  (ngp1a1  - Etpt+r) + ( pt -  pi).  (A1)
Interest rate parity  (9) and  purchasing  power  parity  (8) inply
it  - ii  = (Etpt+l  - Etpt+r)  -  (pt - ptl  ,
sc that the RHs  of  (A1)  is  iderrtically zero,
using  rt  = rt  anil  letting  c + c* = 1. substitutinq  (1) and (4)  into  (?)
yields
rt=rn-  o(pt -  E1-1n1)  -  e*(pl - nt-rpt)  -  (e1  + et)  ,  (A2)
where rn = An  - Yn - Yi is  the real int€rest rate that ex arfe  clears  the
goods harlet.  Next  it  is  sinply a matter of substitutins  (A2), (1)  or  (4)
and (8) into eactr  of the rboney  narl;et  clearing conditions
vd=uQ
- ( 1+  p+m
- (  F*+m
or,
AP1  = XO  + R1t + R2T  + R3E1-1P1  + R4Xg.  (A3)




I n, + (  1+e
I




quasi-reduced  fornr  solutions:
)(1+p+mi)  o*(6+mi)  - 1" 
l[0,  I  _  [ 
{F+ni}  (rn+")  - Yn 
]
) - rl  rn!  + (t+e*)tr*p-**il  l[pt]  [1p*+mi]{rn+o*)  - vfij
t  t 
lliil  *  [ 
r *(1+0]  (F+mi)  0*(p+u,i1 
l[rt-rntl -r€  --fl[;?J  I  eip*+mi) B*  + (1+6*)(F*+ni)lttt-rpt]
1) 1  -1p+nri)  rl[;:l
1) o -{r+p*+nl)  t li;tl 
'Pt=K0+K1t+K2T+K3x1.
it  is  apparent that
E1-1P1  =K9+K1t.
Substituting (A4)  anit (A5)  into  (43) and  equating  coefficients yields:
KO=(l-R3)-1n6
Kl = (l  - R3)-1n1
K2  = (n - R3)-1n2
and
K3  = g-1i. '
Solving  these  natrix  equations  gives the solution presented  in  (14) of  the
text.
II.  Here  we  provide  the definitions of the coefficients in  (18).
a=  [(t+e*)2o; + 92n;*1162  (1+e+O*)2
b = 2[s*(1+o*)oi  + s(1+6)o3*]/e(t+e+e*)2
c = ! [ (1+g*  12  o'?'^  + e2  o;*J  / e(l+e+e*  ]  2
d = 2  [o*  (].+s*)  o: + B(1+o)  a  ?r*7  / 0+a+e*12
e =  [e*2o!  + (1+a)2o]*  + (1+s+s*)2dill(1+e]o*]2
t  =  [  (1+g*)  2o3  + e2  sZ],  + (1+g+o*)  2oz*1  1  11+s+e*1  .2
(A{}
{A5)2L
lTurnovsky (1984)  provides a useful,  representative discussion'
2{e coutd have expressed  y1 and  Vt in  togs anil then nodified  the LIIS  of  (?}
to  contain the share weighted  ).ogs  of  real  output.  Doing  so  however does
not  add  to  the intuition  behind this  nodel and  nrerely  conplicates  the
algebra,
3siegel (1983).  Dotsey  and  King (1983)  anct  Goodfriend  (1981+i  discuss  related
interest  rate  rules  for  closeil econonies'